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TAXATION: PREPAID INCOME DEFERRALS AND THE
"CLAIM OF RIGHT" DOCTRINE
SINCE 1916 accrual basis accounting has been permitted as a general
method of computing taxable income, subject only to the requirement
that it dearly reflect income.' Despite statutory authorization of this
method of tax computation, the judicially-derived "claim of right" doc-
trine has been invoked against taxpayers who, acting in accordance with
accepted principles of accrual accounting, attempt to defer prepaid
receipts to the period when earned.
This doctrine states that, "If a taxpayer receives earnings under a
'claim of right' and without restriction as to its disposition, he has re-
ceived income which he is required to return, even though it may still
be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though
he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent... ?"2 The
doctrine was originally enunciated in North American Oil Consolidated
v. Burnet. It was then promptly applied in Brown v. Helvering,'
' Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1916, taxpayers were permitted to return in-
come using the method of accounting with which their accounts were kept. Revenue
Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 8(g), 39 Stat. 763 (individuals), and § x3 (d), 39 Stat. 771
(corporations). Although the statutes failed to mention the accrual basis by name, the
committee reports, H.R. REi'. No. 922, 64 th Cong., ist Sess. (1916), reprinted 1939-1,
Part 2 CuM. BuLL. z2, and the regulations in effect under the Act, Treas. Reg. 33
§§ xz6, xSo (1918), expressly approved the accrual basis as an acceptable accounting
method under the Act. The present general tax accounting statute, substantially un-
changed over the years, provides that: "Taxable income shall be computed under the
method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income
in keeping his books." INT. Rxv. CODE OF x954, § 446(a). The statute also lists the
accrual basis as one of the permissible methods of accounting. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 446(c) (2).
The Code also provides that income may be returned in a year other than that of
receipt when, under the method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such
amounts are to be properly accounted for in a different period. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 45x. Deductions are to be taken in the proper taxable year as determined under
the method of accounting used in computing taxable income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§461.
2 North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
8 786 U.S. 417. The taxpayer's possession of certain oil fields was disputed by the
government, which in x96 initiated a suit to oust the taxpayer and at the same time
secured the appointment of a receiver to operate the fields and hold the profits. In 1917,
following dismissal of the government's suit, the net profits of x9x6 were released to
the taxpayer. Final settlement of the action was not reached .until 1922, when the
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where an accrual basis taxpayer, who received overriding commissions
on the sale of insurance policies, was taxed on the full amount of the
commissions in the year of receipt, even though he was obligated to
return a portion of them should a policy be cancelled prior to its ex-
piration date. Relying both on the taxpayer's previous treatment of
the commissions as income when received and on the finding of the
Board of Tax Appeals5 that there was no proof that the overriding
commissions contained any element of compensation for services to be
rendered in future years, the Court rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the commissions were unearned and should be prorated over the
lives of the policies. Because the Court regarded the commissions as
earned and retained without contractual or other restrictions, it held
that they were taxable in the year of receipt under the "claim of right"
doctrine. The. taxpayer's alternative attempt to deduct from the re-
ported commissions estimated amounts that would be returned due to
future cancellations was also disallowed on the ground that no liability
accrues during the taxable year on account of expected future cancella-
tions. Unless the events fixing the liability occur during the taxable
year, the liability remains contingent and cannot accrue except where
specifically provided by statute.'
Despite the Court's clear acknowledgment in both cases that it was
dealing with earned amounts, the North American and Brown decisions
have been cited as authority for the proposition that money received
without restriction upon its use or disposition is taxable in the year re-
ceived even though some portion may be unearned. 7 Under this inter-
government's appeal was dismissed. As indicated in the quoted passage, the Court held
the profits taxable to the taxpayer in 197, the year of receipt, and not in 1922, when
the dispute was finally settled. The Court also held that the profits were not income for
1916, the taxpayer having no right to them until '1917 when the court ordered the funds
to be paid over.
' 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
'Brown v. Helvering, za B.T.A. 678 (1931).
'See, e.g., reserve for bad debts, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § x66(c).
'South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.zd 8W8, 819 (5th Cir. 1943);
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 2o T.C. 1033, 1046 (1953). This
use of the doctrine to tax prepaid income has been criticized by some writers. Sidney
Gelfand, who represented the taxpayer in Brissner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, infra
note 25, reviews the doctrine's history and its effect on prepaid income in The "Claim of
Right" Doctrine, 33 TAXES 726 (1955). See also, Sporrer, Past and Future of Deferring
Income and Reserving for Expense, 34 TAxES 45, 46-49 (1956); Jacobs, Changing Atti-
tudes Toward4 Accrual Concepts, N.Y.U. s6TH INST. ON FED. TAX 579 (1958); Heffern,
Claim-of-Right and Other Tax Doctrines Are Distorting Proper Accounting, 5 J.
TAXATION 20 (5956). Mr. Justice Harlan felt that the use of the doctrine should be
restricted to "determining whether the treatment of an item of income should be in-
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pretation taxpayers have been required to report as income in the year
of receipt funds attributable to prepaid dub dues,8 coupons obligating
the taxpayer to render future services,9 tuition for future dance lessons,"0
and prepaid rent."
Congress recognized the inconsistencies between the language of
the accounting statutes and their application, 2 and, in an attempt to
harmonize tax accounting with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples,'3 enacted sections 45214 and 46215 of the 1954 Code which re-
fluenced by the fact that the right to receive or keep it is in dispute; it does not dearly
relate to the entirely different question whether items that admittedly belong to the
taxpayer may be attributed to a taxable year other than that of receipt, in accordance
with the principles of accrual accounting." Automobile Club of Michigan v. Com-
missioner, 353 U.S. 190, 19o-91 (957) (dissenting opinion).
For proper applications of the claim of right doctrine under this view, see Mutual
Tel. Co. v. United States, 2o F.2d 16o ( 9 th Cir. 1953) (where earnings received
under a claim of right, but with restrictions imposed on their disposition, were held not
taxable in the year of receipt), and Bates Motor Transp. Line Inc. v. Commissioner,
20o F.2d 20 ( 7 th Cir. 1952) (where, since the amount of refund could not be deter-
mined until after the close of the taxable year, the taxpayer was required to return
overpayments for services rendered as income in the year of receipt).
*Automobile Club of New York v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. No. 79 (1959); Your
Health Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 385 (194).
' South Tacoma Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 411 (1944). Accord, National
Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 159 (1947) (unused transportation tickets).
1 0 Andrews v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. xo26 (1955).'
"New Capital Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 7o6 (1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d
437 (6th Cir. 1958).
" The inconsistencies stem fundamentally from the different goals sought by financial
and tax accounting. Financial accounting is designed to determine the present and
future earning power of a business, while the primary purpose of tax accounting is to
measure the taxpayer's present ability to make an immediate cash payment of his tax.
See Erbacher, Federal Income Tax .Accounting vs. Accepted Accounting Principles-
From a Lawyer's Viewpoint, 22 U. KAN. CiTy L. REV. 57 (x953-54); Hylton, Dis-
advantages in Conforming Taxable Income to Good Accounting Concepts, 3 J. TAXA-
TION 274 (1955), favoring recognition and maintenance of tax and financial accounting
as distinct systems.
"S. REP. No. 1622, 83 d Cong., zd Sess. 6z (1954).
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, cl. 736 § 452, 68A Stat. i5, permit accrual basis
taxpayers to defer prepaid income which gave rise to a liability, extending beyond the
dose of the taxable year, to render services, furnish goods or other property, or allow
the use of property, to the year or years in which the income would be earned. The
period of deferral for any one prepaid item was not to exceed five years except by
consent of the Secretary or his delegate.
25 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 736, § 462, 68A Stat. 158, provided for the deduc-
tioi of reasonable additions to reserves for estimated expenses. The additions were
subject to a discretionary reduction by the Secretary or his delegate, if considered
excessive.
For a report of the intended effect of §§ 452 and 462, see S. REP. No. x622, 83 d
Cong., 2d Sess. 301-03, 305-07 (1954). Sections 452 and 462 were extensively re-
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spectively permitted the deferral of prepaid income and the establish-
ment of reserves for estimated expenses. At the insistence of the Treas-
ury, section 462 was retroactively repealed 6 due to anticipated revenue
loss, litigation, and abuse of the statutory provisions. 17  Section 452
was repealed at the same time to prevent the accomplishment of the
same ends."8
Despite its early repeal, the enactment of section 452 stimulated
judicial appreciation of accrual accounting principles and prompted
closer examination of disputed accounting methods in the light of the
statutory requirement that accounting methods clearly reflect income.
Deferral of prepaid subscription income over the life of the subscription
was approved in Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,9 while in
Schuessler v. Commissioner" a taxpayer was permitted to deduct the
estimated expense of performance from reported advance payments
under contracts obligating him to turn gas furnaces off and on each year
over a five-year period. Then came Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner," the only case involving prepaid income to reach the
Supreme Court since Brown v. Helvering. In that case club dues
obligating the taxpayer to render emergency road service upon demand
were received a year in advance. To reflect its liability arising from
receipt of the dues, the taxpayer had credited one-twelfth of the dues to
viewed and interpreted in Bierman & Hellerstein, Accounting for Prepaid Income and
Estimated Expenses Under the Internal Revenue Code of z954, 1o TAX L. Rrv. 83
(1954.). For a shorter treatment, see Austin, Surrey, Warren, and Winchov, The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Tax Accounting, 68 HARV. L. REV. 257, 268-70, 273-
76 (.954).
10P.L. 74, 84 th Cong., § i(b), 69 Stat. 134 (955).
"' See Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, H.R. 4725,
84 th Cong., ist Sess. (x95) and Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives on H.R. 4725, 84th Cong., ist Sess. (1955). For a short
report of the repeal see Wagman, Sections 452 and 462: Stormy Past but a Bright To-
morrow, 33 TAXES 711, 715-17 (.955).
'
8 P.L- 74, 84th Cong. §z(a), 69 Stat. 134 (1955). Although it went along with
the repeal, the Senate indicated that it favored the effect §§ 452 and 462 would have
in harmonizing tax and financial accounting, and that it would attempt to devise sub-
stitute provisions for them. S. REP. NO. 372, 84 th Cong., 4-6 ist Sess., reprinted at
1955-11 CUM. BULL. 858, 86o-6i.
29 218 F.2d 697 (ioth Cir. 1955). "Plainly . . . [the statute] . . . contemplates
that prepaid sums can be returned in a year other than when received." Id. at 701.
The Beacon decision has been codified in InT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 455.
20 23o F.zd 722 (5th Cir. 1956) "Clearly what is sought by this statute is an
accounting method that most accurately reflects the taxpayer's income on an annual
accounting basis." Id. at 724.
21 353 U.S. ISo (957).
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prepaid income each month. The Commissioner, applying the "claim
of right" doctrine, required that the dues be taxed in full in the year of
receipt, and his determination was upheld by the Tax Court and the
Court of Appeals. In its affirmance of this decision, however, the
Supreme Court did not expressly rely on the "claim of right" doctrine,
but based its decision on its finding that the taxpayer's deferrals in
monthly amounts were purely artificial and bore no actual relation to
the services which it might be required to render, and therefore failed
dearly to reflect income.22 The Beacon and Schuessler cases were
distinguished as applying only to those situations where the taxpayer
was required to perform specified services on fixed dates after the close
of the tax year. Some writers interpreted the Court's decision in Auto-
mobile Club of Michigan as requiring a fixed date for performance for
the proper deferral of prepaid income, while others felt that, under
the language of the decision, a pro rata deferral might be sustained in
the absence of a requirement for fixed services or specified performance
dates if the monthly allocations bore an accurate statistical relationship
to the actual service to be performed. 24
This latter view was adopted in Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,2 a recent case involving deferrals of receipts derived from service
agreements offered as an inducement to prospective purchasers of tele-
vision sets. 26 The court found that income is dearly reflected where the
2
'1d. at 189-9o.
" Heffern, New Ruling Forecasts IRS Extension of Claim of Right, 9 J. TAXATION
202) 203 (x958), and Note, Prepaid Income Held Taxable in the Year of Receipt, 1957
U. ILL. L.F. 517, 522 (1957).
2 Hoffman, Accounting Treatment Counts in Determining Net Taxable Income, 35
TAXES 9x8, 9z1 (1957) 5 Note, Taxation of Prepaid Income: A Temporary Solution,
67 YALE L.J. 1425, 14.39 (1958).
A more disturbing aspect of the Automobile Club of Michigan case, from the stand-
point of those advocating income deferrals, was the Court's view that the accounting
statute vests the Commissioner with broad discretion to determine whether an account-
ing method clearly reflects income. 4ccord, Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446
(1959). See Heffern, supra note 23, at 203.
25 267 F.zd 520 (zd Cir. 1959).
" The taxpayer, a retail dealer in television sets, offered to the purchasers of its
sets a twelve-month service contract covering installation, adjustment, and replacement
parts. At the end of each taxable year in which the service agreements were in effect,
a large number of contract months remained to be covered. Reporting income from
the contract receipts, the taxpayer followed a consistent plan of income deferral, charging
25% of each contract price to installation income and reporting the balance as service
income over the life of the contract on a monthly pro rata basis. At the end of each
taxable year in which receipts were deferred, the taxpayer had on hand a cash balance
and inventory of replacement parts whose combined value exceeded the total receipts
deferred in that year. Throughout the periods covered by the contracts, the taxpayer
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taxpayer offers ample statistical proof that he was subjected to a uniform
demand for services throughout the contract period and where his
monthly allocations were completely absorbed by the cost of servicing.
In Bressner, the court overcame the "claim of right" doctrine by point-
ing out that originally "the Court held only that money that was earned
and held under a claim of right was includible in the year of receipt."2 7
The court found no interpretation of the doctrine in subsequent cases
which would justify its being used to tax prepaid income in the year of
receipt. It distinguished the Brown decision by the failure of the tax-
payer in that case to prove that the commissions were unearned when
received.28
Bressner reaches a logical result in view of its compelling factual
situation, but the facts themselves limit the value of the decision as
precedent for deferring income where indefinite services are rendered
upon demand. For instance, only that portion of the contract receipts
which related to the taxpayer's liability to render future services was
deferred. Twenty-five per cent of each contract price, an amount closely
approximating the actual cost of installation,2 9 was reported as income
in the year of receipt. The length of the deferral period was short and
definite. Since no part of the prepaid receipts could escape taxation for
more than a year following receipt, the deferral created no greater tax-
collection hazard than exists where a taxpayer receives income on the
first day of the taxable year. Where the deferral period is indefinite"
or long-term, or where the entire prepayment is deferred for inclusion
in a later period,"' the courts should be less inclined to approve the
deferral. Although under no contractual obligation to create and main-
tain a reserve, the taxpayer evidenced cognizance of his legal liability
to service the television sets by maintaining a cash balance and inventory
which exceeded the value of the deferred amounts and approximated a
was subjected to a uniform demand for service, averaging 8 to x2 visits per set. An
overall loss was sustained on the fulfillment of each year's service obligation. The
Commissioner required that the deferred sums be taxed in the year of receipt. The
Tax Court upheld his determination on the grounds that (i) the receipts were held
without restriction as to their use or disposition, and (2) the monthly allocation of the
service receipts was purely artificial and bore no relation to the services the taxpayer
might in fact be called upon to render. 28 T.C. 378 (x957).
27 267 F.ad at 525.281d. at 525-26.
" The price per contract was between $8o and Soo. The cost of installation was
approximately $19: $7 for antenna, $So labor, and $z clerical overhead. Id. at 521.
" South Tacoma Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 411 (2944).
"1 New Capital Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 706 (957).
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trust fund.22  In cases where a taxpayer fails to restrict his use of the
prepayments3 3 he may encounter difficulty in sustaining their deferral.
A more significant factor of the case is the fact that an over-all loss
was sustained in fulfilling the contracts3 4 Where the income-producing
transaction results in a loss, the government's insistence that income be
reported in a particular period is less compelling because the loss may
be transferred from one period to another.35 But where a profit results,
the allocation may be deemed artificial even though the demand for
service is uniform, since the requested services may vary as to their cost,
thus giving rise to high profits in one tax period and low profits in
another. A practical solution to such problems, and to the whole prob-
lem of prepaid income, would be a completed contract arrangement,
similar to that authorized for use by taxpayers in the construction
trades, 8 through which the reporting of all income and expenses arising
from a particular contract is deferred to the year in which the contract is
completed, thereby achieving a truer reflection of income.Y7
The Bressner decision, relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Automobile Club of Michigan, would reject the Commissioner's estab-
lished practice of applying the "claim of right" doctrine to tax prepaid
income in the year of receipt, and would permit such deferrals as are
statistically supported as dearly reflecting income. Although it is de-
sirable to have the income tax follow generally recognized accounting
principles, situations may arise wherein these principles must give way
to practical convenience. By requiring that prepaid income be reported
in the year of receipt, the "claim of right" doctrine lays down a clear
administrative standard for determining the tax period when income
must be returned. Any attempt to follow the Bressner case and to per-
mit prepaid income to be deferred would involve judicial inquiry into
whether, in the given situation, there is a relation between the income
received and the time when it was earned which would justify such
deferral. Since this is largely an ad hoc question, one case could seldom
be regarded as a controlling precedent for another. The result might
32 267 F.zd at 522.
"Phillips v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1956).
2' 67 F.zd at 524.
MINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1957), available to taxpayers engaged in building con-
tracts which will extend for more than one year from date of execution to date of
completion.
" For a discussion of the long-term contract method of accounting see Wagman,
Tax Accounting for Long-Term Contracts, 33 TAxEs 277 (1955).
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well bring an increase in litigation and administrative uncertainty, 8
which would more than offset any theoretical symmetry achieved by a
strict application of the accrual theory of accounting to the income tax.
'An example of the confusion that might result can be derived from Automobile
Club of New- York, Inc. v. Commissioner, 3z T.C. No. 79 (1959), where the Tax
Court, denying the taxpayer's deferral of prepaid dub dues delivered four separate
opinions expressing their interpretation of the effect of Bressner on prepaid income
deferrals.
